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Abstract 
Concern has been expressed at the long delays (especially in economics) faced 
by authors who aim to publish in prestigious refereed academic journals.  
Time delays and the associated uncertainty are an important part of the cost of 
submitting to any top journal.  A commonsense economic principle is that if 
costs increase, supply will fall.  Thus time delays can be used as an implicit 
rationing device to save scarce editorial and refereeing resources.  The 
submission process is seen as a signal extraction problem, where the statistical 
noise is the difference in opinion between the journal’s editors and an author’s 
own view.  It is shown how submission costs can ration the supply of 
submissions and how it influences the quality of submissions depending on the 
signal to noise ratio and where authors may have rational expectations in 
estimating their chances of acceptance. An alternative rationing system, which 
would speed up the decision process, is explored. 
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 Ellison (2002a; 2002b) has confirmed that time lags from submission to acceptance in 
refereed journals are becoming longer.   He suggests an evolving social norm as a 
possible explanation, with more demands now made on authors for their work to be 
considered publishable.  However, time delays have an additional effect, which is to 
limit the flow of submissions.  If submission to academic journals is effectively 
costless, with decisions rapidly reached, then the best strategy is to start at the `top’ 
journal and work down until the article is accepted.  Better  journals are unlikely to 
welcome the prospect of reviewing the large number of submissions this implies.   
 
Submitting to a peer reviewed journal is not a costless activity.  There are direct costs 
such as the submission fee, postage, letter writing, adopting the journal style and so 
on.  There is another major cost, which is the time and its associated uncertainty that 
must be spent waiting for a decision.   Not only have first response times increased 
but `revise and resubmit’ without any guarantee of eventual publication has also 
become a common response.  These surely act as a disincentive to undertake the 
painful but necessary process of peer review.  Ellison notes that time lags are longest 
for the top five economics journals at around six to eleven months longer than the 
rest.  Furthermore, he comments that 
 
`There appears to be increased competition to publish in the top  
journals, in part because the profession has grown, but because 
the number of slots in the top journals has decreased and the top 
journals have become more prestigious.’ 
 
 Despite the increase in prestige, the number of submissions to the top journals have 
remained fairly static, according to Ellison’s data.  Increased submission costs are one 
way whereby a top journal can ration the supply of submissions and save editorial and 
refereeing resources, which most academics do pro bono.   
 
So how do submission costs, of which time is a significant factor, ration the supply of 
the papers and influence their average quality?   Increasing submission costs lower 
supply and make the editorial burden manageable, but raise the possibility that some 
top papers will self-select to alternative journals.  If higher submission costs mean a 
large fall in low quality submissions then there is little incentive to reverse the trend 
of rising submission costs.  What follows explains this trade-off using a statistical 
model of the submission process, which takes account of the fact that submission is 
inherently chancy.    
 
The concluding comments suggest an alternative to the pro bono system.  There is a 
general awareness that the world is suffering from `information overload’, yet, despite 
these changes, the means by which such information is quality ranked has hardly 
changed at all, beyond a gradual grinding to a halt of peer review.  Time delays are a 
pure deadweight loss.  People want to be made aware of what is really worth knowing 
about faster. 
I. Signal Extraction 
A. The omniscient referee 
Do better papers direct themselves towards better journals?  The problem is that 
authors are not necessarily the best judges of the quality of their own work, but it is 
 authors who decide where to submit their work.  One’s own evaluation is bound to be 
an imprecise signal of true quality; one function of peer review is to determine the 
true worth of an academic paper.   
 
The issue is a signal extraction problem and the framework can show how submission 
costs affect the submission process and the quality of papers a journal will receive.  
Phelps (1972) and Lucas (1977) previously used this approach in two classic papers 
on job search and the business cycle.   If authors with a low perception of the quality 
of their work find it too costly to submit to top journals and if this perception is 
correlated with true quality, then there is useful self-selection.  
 
Assume  there is an `omniscient referee’ who can determine a paper’s true quality and 
let the distribution of true quality given by ),(~ 2zzNz σ .   Think of z as some 
univariate scale with higher values indicating better quality.  Let the distribution of 
authors’ beliefs  (denoted as  q) be related to z as follows: 
vzq +=            (1) 
where v is a random variable ),(~ 2vvN σ .  The v term represents the noise, with q the 
noisy signal of true quality.  The larger 2vσ  then the less accurate are authors’ 
perceptions about the true worth of their own work.  One’s guess is that 2vσ  is likely 
to be large.  Typically, authors will solicit feedback on their work by sending off 
discussion papers to colleagues, giving seminars etc., which will enable them to give a 
more accurate assessment of their own work.  Experience no doubt contributes to the 
accuracy of q as a signal – previous successes, esteem of colleagues and so on.  All 
 these factors will contribute to the size of 2vσ  relative to 2zσ .  The point is that the 
`omniscient referee’ usually has a different view and v  represents this difference of 
opinion.  A positive v means a negative view relative to an author’s  personal opinion. 
 
A positive v  term represents a systematic overestimate of true quality.  
Overconfidence is an endemic human quality and most likely v  is positive.1  True 
quality on average is likely to somewhat less than our own beliefs.  It turns out that 
systematic optimism is not important to the effectiveness of the signal extraction 
process.  On one set of assumptions, it may have a role in determining a journal’s 
efficiency. A second approach, which assumes that authors have rational expectations, 
implies that systematic optimism is unimportant. 
 
z and v are possibly correlated, which could be denoted as the `vanity’ and `modesty’ 
factors.  Suppose it turns out that someone with a high z tends to have negative value 
of v, i.e. the person undervalues his or her work, and a low z author tends to have an 
exaggerated opinion with a positive v.  In this case vzσ will be < 0.    The opposite 
case is 0>vzσ , with the high achievers tending to vanity and the low achievers 
exhibiting modesty.  To simplify and because it makes no central difference, assume 
0=vzσ .  
The distribution of z and q will then be: 
                                                 
1
 Smith (1776) summed this up as `the natural confidence which every man has more or less, not only 
in his own abilities, but in his own good fortune.’ (chap.10) 
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To establish the conditional expectation qEz | , think of regression line of z on q:   
ε++= bqaz           (3) 
where a and b are parameters and ε  is a statistical error ( )0=εE .  It follows that: 
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It can also be shown that: 
222 )1( zzb σσσ ε ≤−=          (5) 
and this error term is homoscedastic, independent of q. Equation (3) shows that 
quality z  will be correlated with q (when 0=zvσ , the correlation coefficient for 
eq.(3) will be b ) and eq.(5) shows that as long as b > 0  the conditional standard 
error will be smaller than the unconditional variance of true quality 2zσ .  So the signal 
offers two properties; it improves the forecast of mean quality and it makes the 
forecast less prone to error. 
 
Equations (3) and (5) offer insights as to how better quality submissions might self-
select into better journals.  The constant term obviously exercises no (relative) 
influence, rather it is the value of b that matters.  Since 10 ≤≤ b , z will on average be 
better for those whose own perception of quality, q, is higher except when noise 
 totally dominates and b= 0.  This signal will, however, be imperfect.  The nearer b is 
to zero the less effective the signal.  In the limit, as 02 →vσ ,  the signal will become 
perfect with 1→b  and 02 →εσ .  So editors and referees will, because of noisy 
signals, spend considerable time rejecting unsuitable articles, despite some self-
selection.  The idea is to explore the relationship between the level of noise in the 
signal and the motivation for the journal to be efficient.  
 
B.  What happens if referees are not omniscient? 
 
Referees are human and so in addition to eq.(1), let ζ+= zr , where r is the referee’s 
opinion, which is additionally a noisy signal of true worth, which is z as before.  The 
competence of the editorial process is therefore measured by 2ζσ .  However, what 
matters is r rather than z   - authors want a top journal publication, and will let 
posterity be the judge of z.  So the relevant question is how good a signal q is for r  
not for z.   The distribution of r and q (assuming zero covariances across z, ξ and v)  is  
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extraction process ε++= bqar , the value of b is exactly as before.  However, for 
any given value of b, the signal will become noisier.  The variance of 2εσ  = 
22 )1( zb σσ ξ −+   increases by 2ξσ .    Later eq.(3) is used to calculate the probability that 
a submission for a given q exceeds an acceptance standard.  For the omniscient 
referee this will be the probability that z exceeds the standard and for the non-
omniscient case this would be the probability that r exceeds the standard (now 
calculated from the  ε++= bqar  line).  If authors submit on the basis of 
 probabilities, it is what the referee thinks rather than the unobservable truth that really 
matters.  All that would be required would be to factor in the additional noise 2ξσ  in 
making this second calculation.2  A second effect of non-omniscience  would be to 
negatively affect the average quality of accepted papers.  Clearly, a top journal would 
not remain top for long if its refereeing procedures were fundamentally flawed.  The 
following assumes omniscience.  
 
II.  The top journal’s objectives and instruments. 
The first objective is an acceptance standard zT and the top journal will publish 
submitted articles with Tzz ≥ (though it may not aim to `capture’ all papers that meet 
this standard).  In practice good referees, through useful comments, will help generate 
negative v for `nearly there’ papers, but this process is ignored here.  The omniscient 
referee’s primary role is a talent spotter.  
 
The journal’s second objective is to fill the `available slots’ (call it n) with articles that 
meet the acceptance standard (so n cannot exceed the number papers with Tzz ≥ ).  
This objective can be equivalently expressed as a target success rate, i.e. the journal 
will aim to publish a given proportion of the population of papers with Tzz ≥ .  Given 
that uncertainty is the norm, the best that a journal can do is to ensure that the 
expected flow of accepted articles equals n.  One reason why journals  keep a backlog 
                                                 
2
 It is not necessarily the case that the referee will report z plus a random error as the above assumes.  If 
referees were aware of their fallibility, they would engage in the same type of signal extraction process 
as the author (my own personal preference).   Authors are aware of how referees make their fallible 
judgments and it is possible to write out equations for the submission probability for either of the two 
assumptions made about the non-omniscient referee.  This gives two possible equations, equivalent to 
 of publishable papers is to smooth out fluctuations in submission quality – in the same 
way as a firm  keeps inventories to iron out fluctuations in demand.  A systematic 
change in the backlog would be a useful signal to change the acceptance standard or 
submission costs.  A journal might also have some limited flexibility in the size of n 
to iron out fluctuations.  However, a noticeably  `thin’ issue might be thought of as a 
bad signal, which editors would seek to avoid.  A third (less precise) objective is to 
have an acceptable refereeing burden – how many papers have to be processed to 
meet n and zT?  Is this burden acceptable? 
 
The journal has two instruments to meet these three objectives.  The first is  zT , so the 
acceptance standard is  both an instrument and objective.  The second instrument is 
submission costs.     Now a general rule is that with two instruments, three objectives 
are not always achievable; there is one degree of freedom short.  Where there is 
certainty, it will be seen that the top journal has considerable power and flexibility 
and can easily meet its objectives. A degree of uncertainty, which is the only realistic 
possibility, leads to limitations on what can be achieved.  Since the third objective has 
not been made exact, it may be that the journal is content with the required editorial 
burden that the two other objectives imply, but the objectives may need to change 
when this is not the case. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
eq. A3 in the appendix. In other words, there is a large amount that could be written on the issue of 
`two-sided uncertainty’. Leslie (2004) looks at this. 
 III. Submission strategy 
The decision process is the following.  The author assesses the costs and benefits of 
submitting.  A breakeven probability is established at or above which it is considered 
worthwhile to take a chance on submitting.  The next stage is to calculate the 
probability of acceptance on the basis of one’s own q value and the journal’s 
acceptance standard.  If this assessment of the personal probability of success is at or 
above the breakeven value then submit.  This probability can be given an exact value 
if rational expectations are assumed. 
 
A. Calculating the breakeven probability 
The choice is submit to the top journal or decide (because of submission costs) that it 
is not worthwhile to do this. If the choice is to submit to the top journal, expected 
utility is: 
111 )2()1()1()1( CVpUpV −−+=        (6) 
U(1) is the utility of a top journal acceptance; p1 is the probability of a top journal 
acceptance, C1 is submission costs (measured in lost utility) to the top journal and 
V(2) is the expected utility of the alternative strategy ( 222 )3()1()2( CVpUp −−+=  
and so on).  Being top implies )2()1( UU >  and 21 pp <  and so on.  So if 
)2()1( VV ≥ then submit to the top journal, otherwise choose V(2).    The frowned 
upon practice of simultaneous adoption of both strategies is ruled out.    
 
 Several reasons have already been suggested for a positive C1: (1) direct costs, which 
are submission fees, postage, general bother and so on (2) disappointment costs, 
which is the pain of rejection (3) (and probably now the most important) the long and 
uncertain time lags involved in reaching a decision.  In a world where the probability 
of acceptance in the top journal is low, many will simply decide that it is not 
worthwhile to hang around for a decision.  C1  is an instrument that can be used to 
ration the supply of submissions.   
 
The breakeven acceptance probability (denoted p*) occurs when V(1) =  V(2)  and the 
solution is seen in fig.(1), which plots V(1)
 
 and V(2) against p1.  V(2)  increases with 
p1, because someone with a high p1 would be correspondingly  more optimistic about 
success in the alternative strategy.  V(1) lies below V(2)  when  p1 = 0  and above V(2)  
when p1 = 1 (so the latter rules out an unrealistic case whereby, even if a top journal 
publication is guaranteed submission costs are so high, the V(2) strategy is chosen at 
all values of p1).   So if p1 < p* then do not submit to the top journal, and if *1 pp ≥  
choose the top journal.  The same breakeven  value of p*  is assumed for all, which is 
a useful but probably unrealistic simplification.  For example, some may be more 
desperate for a publication than others (imminent tenure decision) and place a high 
value on time.  Others (professorial application) value quality and place a lower value 
on time delays.  
 
As an example, in a one journal world where V(2)  is the fixed, zero cost, no 
publication utility U(0), then the breakeven probability would be: 
)0()1(*
1
UU
Cp
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 With a two journal pecking order, p*  would be a function of  the three alternative 
utilities and two submission costs and so on.   
 
It is clear that in rise in C1 relative to other journal submission costs will raise p*, just 
as a rise in submission costs for other journals, relative to C1 will lower p*.  Less 
obvious is the proposition that a general rise in submission costs, caused say by  a 
general rise in delays across all journals, will raise p*.  To see this let the pecking 
order of journals be indexed 1, 2, 3… and the associated probabilities of acceptance be 
p1, p2,p3…. . , where p1
  
<  p2  <   p3  …. .  By successively substituting out V(2), V(3) 
and so on derive an expression for the change in V(1)-V(2) for a common change in 
submission costs C∆ .  This is: 
)]2()1([ VV −∆ =  0...])1)(1()1(1(1[ 3221 ≤+−−+−++−∆ ppppC   (8) 
Equation (9) would equal zero only if there was an infinite number of iterations and p1
  
=  p2  =   p3  ….  In practice, neither condition will hold, so a general cost rise means 
p*  will  rise.  Ellison (2002a) observed both rises in relative and general delays. 
B. Calculating the probability of acceptance 
Authors are assumed to be well informed about the acceptance standard.3   A simple 
view would be that only those with a Tzq ≥  will submit to the top journal, but 
introspection shows that this is not how most will operate.  Where there is uncertainty, 
people submit on the basis of probabilities, and only a few `superstars’ will think that 
acceptance in the top journal is a done deal, irrespective of their perception of q.   
                                                 
3
 In economics, we all have a fairly close idea of what these are. Some examples: Smyth and Smyth 
(2001), Diamond (1989), Burton and Phimister (1995), Conroy and Dusansky (1995), Smyth (1999).  
Ellison (2002a) also suggests that there is a self-evident core of top journals. 
  
The non-rational approach assumes that the probability of acceptance is independent 
of a knowledge of the signal extraction process.  So one plausible view might be to 
assume: 
0,0),( 111 <>=
TzqT
ppzqpp         (9) 
These may or may not coincide with the rational probabilities. These `true’ 
probabilities, which are the signal extraction model’s predictions, are now discussed. 
 
Authors will be aware of the general idea that journal submission is risky and that the 
omniscient referee’s opinion does not always coincide with one’s own q value.  With 
typical rejection rates of over 95% or higher, more often than not the median 
submission will be rejected.  Rejection is part and parcel of the peer review process.  
Indeed a rational individual will be aware of the signal extraction process.  Looking at 
eq.(3), a specific author will have a fixed value for his or her q.  So the relevant 
question for the rational author is `What is the probability I will be accepted in the top 
journal, i.e. what is )( bqazP T −−≥ε ?  Is this larger than the breakeven p* value?’    
This takes account of the fact that authors are aware of the signal extraction process 
and that high q will have on average a higher value of v.   The rational approach is to 
use these objective probabilities as the basis for decision-making.  Rationality means 
authors know something about the distribution of z and v  as well as  their own q value 
and can take these into account when they make the submission decision.  What they 
do not know is the precise value of z, at least not before receiving the editor’s report!    
  
Rationality can be understood by considering the limiting case where noise dominates 
with b=0.  In this case everyone submits to the top journal or nobody submits at all if 
submission costs are the same for all.  The reason is this.  Under rationality authors 
are aware that they are their own worst judges of quality – the omniscient referee 
places no weight on q and authors  know this.  Hence authors all consider themselves 
to have an equal chance of acceptance.  Hence submit if the expected utility of 
submission exceeds the utility of the alternative strategy.   
 
In short, the rational individual is governed by eq.(3) and the irrational individual by a 
simplistic interpretation of eq.(1).  The properties of the rational probability )(εP  are 
straightforward apart from the effect of changes in b (noise).    A fall in b causes the 
distribution of q to become more spread out and has two possibly opposing forces.  
First it reduces qEz | , which tends to make )(εP  smaller.  However it also increases 
the variance of ε , which also affects )(εP .   Section VII and the appendix discuss 
rationality for all values of b (including the special case b=0 discussed).  It is shown  
that more noise, cet. par.,  can lead to more or fewer submissions depending on 
parameter values. The next section explores the least complicated case when b =1. 
IV. The certainty case  
A. The simple (in)efficiency hypothesis  
 
Figure (2) is the starting point;  b=1 and  there is no systematic optimism, thus q = z.  
q is plotted along the horizontal axis and z on the vertical and is the 45-degree line 
shown.  zT  is shown as the horizontal line, at or above which an article is accepted. 
Assume individuals are not rational and from eq.(9) a critical value of q*  can be 
 calculated associated with  p*. A q value at or above q*  means p1  is at or above p* 
and these individuals submit to the top journal. 
 
q*  is shown as the vertical line and in this situation all articles between q’ and q*  
will be rejected.  However, the journal can avoid this oversupply of sub-standard 
articles by raising p*  to ensure that q*  equals  q’  by increasing submission costs.  In 
this situation the editor’s task will be easy since all submitted articles will reach the 
required standard. Rational expectations change this result as the following will show. 
B.  The effect of overconfidence 
 
This encourages inefficiency and the intuition is quite clear. Overconfidence 
encourages submissions to the top journal.  The work minimizing  response is to 
ration by raising submission costs.  Figure (3)  illustrates this, where there is a parallel 
shift in the 45-degree line by the amount v .  There is now an oversupply of articles 
and the response will be to become  less efficient and raise q*  to q’’ .   
 
The certainty case illustrates the self-equilibrating effect when probabilities are 
calculated rationally.  Forget about eq.(9) and reason as follows.  Rationality would 
cause authors to re-calculate their probabilities.  In the fig.(2) case under rationality, 
there would be no need to adjust submission costs.  Suppose q*  led to an oversupply 
of articles.  Since there is no uncertainty authors  would realize that articles between 
q* and q’  are bound to be rejected, so consequently these people would adjust their p1 
probability to zero.  Rationality would automatically cause q*  to rise to q’.    A 
similar argument can be applied to fig.(3) so  q*  will automatically chase q’’  under  
rationality and no uncertainty.   
  
The logic in this zero noise case is pretty compelling.  However, the information 
requirements for rationality are minimal in the certainty case, but when there is 
uncertainty it is less self-evident that authors are capable of all the complex 
calculations that complete rationality would require.  Nevertheless, the example surely 
shows that to ignore rationality altogether is also an extreme assumption. 
 
Suppose in fig.(2)  q* = q’  and the top journal becomes less efficient by increasing 
the time delay.  The q*  line will shift to the right.  Now with zT  unchanged it turns 
out that some papers with z > zT  go elsewhere.  Rationality dictates that these articles 
ought to be submitted to the top journal.  So the line shifts back to its original q’ 
position once more.    This  illustrates the proposition that top journals can be as 
efficient or as inefficient as they like, when authors automatically react to such 
behavioural changes.  In this simple set-up the top journal bears no cost for its 
inefficiency – the best articles still roll in no matter what.  The only limiting factor 
would be when C1
 
becomes so high that V(2) lies above V(1) in fig.(1) when p1 =1. 
 
So rationality under certainty gives the top journal considerable power in terms of its 
objectives.  Setting n  to some desirable level establishes zT.  No need to worry unduly 
about submission costs because the objectives are automatically achieved when 
authors are rational.  Uncertainty limits this power.    
V. The effect of uncertainty 
Introducing noise into fig.(2) (i.e. some fixed positive value of 2vσ ) will have the 
effect of pivoting the 45-degree line clockwise, where the pivot point will be at the 
 mean values of z  and q, which are vzz +,  . It is reasonable to assume that the top 
journal sets Tz  above  z . Figure (4) illustrates, where for convenience the origin is 
set at vzz +, . Recall from eq.(3) that this new line plots the expected quality of 
submissions, so the journal’s editors and the `omniscient referee’ now have a real job. 
Realized quality will be distributed around this line, with variance 2εσ  for any given 
q.  Shown also is a critical value q* .  Below q* it is not worthwhile to submit.   
 
The zT  and q*  lines divide fig.(4) into four quadrants.  In quadrant 1 are found papers 
with a standard Tz≥  but which are not submitted.  In quadrant 2 are found submitted 
papers that are accepted.  Quadrant 3 are rejected papers and quadrant 4 are below 
standard papers that are not submitted.   Quadrants 1 and 3 might be thought of as 
Type 1 and Type 2 error and there is now a trade-off between the two.  Shifting q*  
left reduces Type 1 error at the expense of increased Type 2 error.  The top journal 
may not necessarily regard Type 2 error as a bad thing; high rejection rates are 
sometimes viewed as an important signal of journal quality.  Type 1 error is probably 
good for democracy; the top journal can never establish a complete hegemony over 
the best articles.  It can at best ensure that the expected standard of accepted articles is 
better than the rest, but it cannot guarantee always to publish the best articles. 
 
So do submission costs have a role to play?  In the certainty case it was seen that 
under rationality  the submission decision does not depend on costs (extreme values 
excepted).  Now there is a role for these as an independent instrument to affect the 
relative size of the two types of error.  A lowering of costs reduces p*   and 
accordingly q* will shift left.  Notice that lower submission costs have diminishing 
returns, because the expected quality of the marginal (q*) paper will decline.  
 Consequently, the effect of lower costs will be to increase the journal’s expected 
rejection rate, even though the omniscient referee will identify a larger number of 
acceptable papers. 
 
Figure (4) can illustrate the difference between the rational  approach  and the non-
rational approach, by considering a useful benchmark case.  Suppose that p* = 0.5.  
Under rationality, q*  would locate exactly where zT  exactly intersects the 
bqaqEz +=| line.  Only at that point would there be a 50% chance that z  would 
exceed zT.  Under non-rationality, it would not be possible to be so precise, because 
the subjective probability of acceptance of the marginal paper need not equal the 
objective probability as embodied in the signal extraction process (the appendix 
calculates the rational probabilities more generally). 
 
Because rationality helps tie down the analysis and a view that rationality is a sensible 
way to make optimal decisions, this will be the assumption from now on.  But the 
usual criticism of rational expectations models applies and whether the subjective and 
objective probabilities coincide are not issues that can be solved by an appeal to 
theory alone.    
VI.  Raising standards 
Suppose the top journal raises zT.  When there is no uncertainty, the effect is simple 
since q*  will chase zT as authors automatically adjust to new information.  Under 
uncertainty, Figure (5) shows the impact of raising the minimal acceptance standard 
by an amount Tz∆ . Assume initially that this has no impact on U(1).  Clearly at q*  
the probability of acceptance has now declined and the breakeven q shifts right.  
 Under rationality it is seen that the rise in the expected standard of the marginal paper 
must be exactly Tz∆ , thus q  rises to q**  as shown.   This arises because the 
probability of acceptance is a function of the difference between qEzzT |−  .  The 
same difference will (for a given 2εσ  which is the case here as b has not changed) 
have the same probability of acceptance.   
 
But that is not the end of the matter.  Raising standards will increase the prestige of 
publishing in the top journal.  So U(1)  will rise and p*  falls in consequence.  So the 
breakeven q will shift left from q**.  The `prestige’ effect is not readily quantifiable, 
but it could be considerable. This is the age of superstardom as in Rosen (1981), 
where being worthy counts for less.  As an example, in the UK academic market 
departments are graded from 5* down to 1 for their research prowess.  Resources, 
which are mostly from state funds, are disproportionately directed towards those few 
departments with top grades, which basically means how many articles are published 
in the best journals.  Indeed departments with grade 3* and below receive no funding.  
So it is not unrealistic to think that there could be a large fall in p* and  the final 
position of the breakeven q could even lie to the left of q* , meaning more not fewer 
submissions.   
 
If the journal’s objective is to restore q to q**, i.e. to raise the expected standard of 
the marginal submission by the same amount as it raises its acceptance standard, then 
the appropriate response is to raise C1 to exactly offset the prestige effect.  Increasing 
inefficiency is therefore a rational response to rising standards and a world where 
rewards become more disproportionately skewed towards the subset of elite academic 
 journals. It is noteworthy that Ellison (2002a) observes that citations are increasingly 
skewed towards a small number of key journals. 
VII. The effect of increasing noise for a given zT 
Assume that the top journal sets a high submission cost regime, or more precisely 
where the breakeven probability of acceptance, p*, exceeds )( TzzP ≥ . The appendix 
explains the following predictions as well as exploring predictions from other (less 
tough) regimes as b moves from 1 to 0. Typically, a top journal would set a `tough’ 
regime described here. 
• The impact will be to increase the journal’s overall submission rate, but at 
lower values of b the submission rate will decline to zero. 
• The acceptance rate for submitted papers declines from 100% to p*.   
• The success rate (i.e. the proportion of the population of top papers that the top 
journal publishes) declines from 100% to zero. 
• The expected standard of submitted papers declines. 
• The expected standard of accepted papers will increase. 
 
Figure (6) illustrates these results for a hypothetical top journal whose objective is to 
publish the top 0.1% of papers.  Four submission regimes are shown in each panel. In 
regime 1 the breakeven probability of acceptance p* is set at 1% - authors submit if 
there is a 1% chance or better of being accepted.  Other regimes are a p* of 3%, 5% 
and 10%, so they represent increasing submission costs. 
 
The z distribution has an arbitrary mean value of 100 and standard deviation 4, 
implying a  zT  of 112.36 shown in the panel 1.  Panel 1 shows the declining 
 submission standard as noise increases as well as a small rise in the expected standard 
of accepted papers.  The probabilities  shown in panels 2-4 are independent of this 
arbitrary scaling of the z distribution (see appendix); what matters  is the size of p* 
relative to the 0.1% target. 
 
The second panel shows the submission rates, with their characteristic inverted U 
shape for a given p*.  As p* rises  submissions decline for any given b level.  Panels 3 
and 4 illustrate the Type 2 and Type 1 error trade-off.   In panel 3,  the acceptance rate 
falls fairly sharply from 100%, rapidly coming close to its minimum p*  value.  
Higher p*  means a greater probability of acceptance for any given b, which is 
reflected in panel 1 where, given b,  the expected standard of submission rises with 
p*.  Panel 4 shows the Type 1 error.  For any given b the success rate (the percentage 
of all the papers with Tzz ≥  that the top journal publishes) declines as p* rises.   
 
Panel 4 shows how the journal might achieve its other two objectives (having 
established zT), given that the parameter b is outside the journal’s control. The 
available slots n imply a target success rate, so together with b, where these two lines 
intersect will determine the required level of p*, which in turn determines the 
submission costs.  The submission rate and acceptance rate will be determined from 
panels 2 and 3, which together determine the editorial burden.  Thinking now of the 
journal’s third objective concerning an acceptable editorial burden, this may or may 
not be achieved.  The journal could respond to a high editorial burden by raising its 
submission costs, reducing submissions and increasing the acceptance rate – but the 
second objective of a given success rate would have to become less ambitious. 
 VIII. Concluding comments 
 
One lesson of rational expectations is that changing the rules alters behavior.  So are 
there useful policy prescriptions from this view of the submission process, in 
particular is there a better rationing regime than time delays?  The current pro bono 
system is sustained by a type of Akerlof (1982) gift relationship principle of  `I 
referee because in return someone else will referee my papers – so overall I will break 
even’.  Nevertheless, the opportunities for free-riding and lethargy when faced with a 
specific refereeing task do not need to be spelt out, much as the public spiritedness 
behind the present system is commendable.  Sometimes refereeing can inform the 
referee and is willingly done, but this is often not the case.  Journals have little 
incentive (or indeed the means) to change the present system. 
 
So the policy suggestion is to substitute an explicit and transparent price mechanism, 
far beyond the present fees charged by some journals.  Such a system will have many 
benefits, chief among which is to eliminate the deadweight losses associated with 
lengthy decision lags. 
• Referees are paid a fee, which is sufficient to make it worthwhile to undertake 
the task and is only payable if a response is made within a preset (short) time 
limit.  Unacceptably brief reports would not be paid. 
• All submissions are charged a fee, sufficient to maintain the journal’s three 
key objectives. It would be important that institutions not  subsidize 
submission fees to avoid reducing the private costs of submission. 
• Accepted articles will have the submission fee refunded. 
 • A strict time limit for  `first response’ and subsequent iterations are set.  Late 
responses will imply a compensation payment to the author from the journal.  
Journals would be obliged to disclose its compensation payments. 
 
So the idea is to substitute a fee for time delays and this is consistent with the analysis 
of the submission process.  If the journal wishes to maintain the same p*   it can set an 
appropriate submission fee to achieve this.  Given the refund aspect in point 3, the 
implicit fee is  (1- p*)C1, so the fee that maintains the status quo ante would be the 
monetary equivalent of  C1/(1-p*).  
 
 
The financial technology now exists to run such a system where academics are spread 
worldwide. For example `Paypal’ or an equivalent could be used for submission 
debits and refereeing credits.  Thus the claim that a payment system penalizes 
academics outside of the dollar zone is no longer credible.  An appropriate temporary 
`overdraft’ facility could be set to ameliorate capital market constraints; academic 
institutions could also operate an overdraft facility (but not a direct subsidy).  A 
databank of available referees, their relevant experience and availability could be 
maintained, available to journal editors to consult.  Given the financial incentives, 
referees would become an army of willing volunteers, as opposed to the present 
system of often reluctant conscripts.  
 
In this system `equilibrium authors’ will neither gain nor lose over their academic 
lifecycles.  They more or less receive in refereeing what is paid out in submission 
fees.  So much of the process would be a game of monetary `musical chairs’ with 
 debits going out of one pocket and credits into another.  But this game changes 
incentives at the margin.    At present, a specific refereeing task offers less incentive 
in contrast to a system of monetary rewards.   
 
The system is fairer, because those who choose not to referee do not get paid.  The 
system does not penalize success, because successful authors are refunded.  The 
system eliminates not only the long average delays, but also the uncertainty that 
surrounds these delays.  It is my view that it is the uncertainty that most academics 
find so irritating and costly.  All the deadweight losses of these two aspects of time 
are eliminated.  Those with a comparative advantage in publishing will have an 
incentive to do less refereeing.  Refereeing will be seen as an honorable profession, 
rather than as a chore.   For example, many older academics have a comparative 
advantage in refereeing compared with the young.  So an academic lifecycle might 
see deficits at the beginning and surpluses at the end.  Monetary credibility, however, 
would require that accounts be settled at appropriate intervals. The compensation 
principle would force editors to be effective, or face sanctions from their management 
boards as the journal loses money and its reputation.   The fact that a fee is involved 
makes it clear that authors can expect a service.  The present system often makes 
people reluctant to complain about unacceptable delays for fear of jeopardizing their 
chances of eventual publication.  Finally, the system would discourage consistent `no 
hopers’ from continuing to submit articles.  Rejection would imply real costs and 
those with little reputation would receive few refereeing requests. The collective 
editorial burden would fall.     
 
 Can journals operate such a system independently, or is a collectively agreed 
monetary union required?   My guess is that if a few lead journals took the initiative, 
the rest would soon follow.  Non-paying journals would soon find it difficult to obtain 
quality referees, and their reputation would quickly fall.   
 
Is such a system viable?   Recall that the submission fee is such that the journal 
achieves its three objectives, alongside a prompt service.  This may not exceed the 
amount that referees would need to be paid to provide a prompt and thorough report – 
especially if a journal asks for more than one report per submission. I fully concur 
with Bergstrom (2001) that academics should take away control from commercial 
publishers.  Some of these rentals could be used to finance any shortfall in the above 
calculation.  I happen to edit a small circulation economic journal, and to be viable it 
is necessary to be efficient.  By doing all operations in-house including printing 
(moving from a commercial printer reduced printing costs by an amazing 75% and 
with better quality).  It amazes me just how cheaply an academic journal can be 
produced.  Either large circulation journals have too high a cost base and/or make 
huge profits.  Cost reform combined with a universal system of proper rewards for 
referees and financial sanctions against journals that fail to deliver on promises could 
do much to improve the lives of academic researchers. 
Appendix Summary under rational expectations 
Assume 0=v , as this makes no difference to the rational model.   p* is the breakeven 
acceptance probability from fig.(1).  Let z*   be the unconditional probability that an 
article meets the submission standard, i.e. TzzP ≥( ) and assumed to be 0.1% in 
 Section VII.   Only in special cases will the journal achieve 100% success and publish 
all papers with Tzz ≥ .   
1 Submission probability 
Let =*p  1- )~( pΦ ,where Φ is cumulative standard normal distribution function and 
p~ is the associated critical value.  Let z~ be the associated critical value of Φ  for z*.  
Hence zT zzz σ~+= .  The key task is to calculate from eq.(3) the rational 
expectations critical value of q* associated with  p* .  Those with a q *q≥ submit, and 
are those whose rational expectations probability of success is at least p*.  We require 
the q*  that satisfies: 
**))1((*)|( pbqzbzPqzzP TT =−−−≥=≥ ε     (A1) 
 Because 
zb σ
ε
5.0)1( −  is a standard normal variable, it follows that: 
b
bpz
zq z
))1(~~(
*
5.0−−
+=
σ
       (A2) 
(Note that if 0~5.0* =⇒= pp (the benchmark case discussed in Section V) then 
Tz zzzqEz =+= σ~*| , which is independent of b.) 
Because ),(~
2
b
zNq zσ , then the  normalized critical value of q*  is: 
)1,0(~)1(~~~ 5.05.05.0 Nbbpbzq −−= −−      (A3) 
 
This is the critical equation that drives the results in Section VII.  The submission rate 
is *)( qqP ≥ , which is exactly )~(1 qΦ− .  Clearly a rise in q~ means a fall in the 
submission rate.  The point is that this can rise or fall as b  declines depending on the 
value of p* relative to z*  (Section VII assumes p* > z* ).   
  
Some properties of eq.(A3): 
1. As b → 1  then zq ~~ → .  This is the fig.(2) case under rationality, where the 
submission rate is exactly z* . 
2. As 0→b , then ∞→q~ if **~~ pzpz <⇒> .   Thus the submission rate will 
decline to zero if the journal’s target proportion of top papers is below the 
critical probability of acceptance.  Section VII assumes this is the case. 
3. As 0→b , then −∞→q~ if **~~ pzpz >⇒< .   Thus submission rate will rise 
to 100% if the journal’s target proportion of top papers is above p*.   Points 2 
and 3 are the either all submit or none submit case described Section II. 
4. 5.05.01 )1(~5.0~5.0
~
−−− −+−=
∂
∂ bpbqb
b
q
.   When 0~ <p (i.e. when p* >  0.5 )  this 
is always negative.  Thus the submission rate will steadily decline from z*  to 
zero.  When 0~ >p  then as 1→b , then +∞→
∂
∂
b
q~
 Taken together this means 
that where z*< p* < 0.5, the submission rate will first increase, then decrease 
as  b falls.  Section VII assumes this regime.   
5. Section VI discussed the effect of an increased acceptance standard.  
5.0
~
~
b
z
q
=
∂
∂
, hence a rise in the acceptance standard will lead to a fall in the 
submission rate.  However, it was argued that this is an unrealistic experiment 
because  p* (which determines p~ ) and zT (which determines z~ ) are not 
independent.  Rising standards raise the returns to success, lowering p* for 
given submission costs.  From eq.(A3) if the submission rate remains constant 
then this requires zbp ~)1(~ 5.0. ∆−=∆ − , where p~∆ is the induced change in p~  
 from a change in the acceptance standard.  If 5.0)1(
~
~
−−>
∆
∆ b
z
p
  then the 
submission rate increases for any rise in z~ .  Thus more noise means makes it 
more likely that that the submission rate will rise in response to rising 
acceptance standards.  To give an idea of numbers, suppose the journal aimed 
to double its quality by accepting only the top 0.05% of papers instead of the 
top 0.1%.   The submission rate would remain constant if (roughly speaking) 
the breakeven value of p* also halved (calculated at b=0.5) 
2. Success rate 
The success rate is  )~(1
*)&(
z
qqzzPS T
Φ−
≥≥
= .  The denominator is constant for a given 
zT.   The success rate is directly proportional to changes in the joint probability of 
submission and that the submissions meet the required standard.  The numerator is a 
bivariate normal distribution, where   *)&( qqzzP T ≥≥  = ),~,~( ρqz −−Θ , where Θ  is 
the standard joint normal cumulative distribution function and ρ  is  the correlation 
coefficient between z and q.   When 1→= bρ , we know from point 1 above that 
zq ~~ → .  So  )~(1)~(),~,~( zzqz Φ−=−Φ→−−Θ ρ .  The success rate tends to 100%.  
 
Now consider what happens as 0→b .  
)~(1)~(1
))~(1(*))~(1(
)~(1
),~,~( q
z
qz
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qz
Φ−→
Φ−
Φ−Φ−
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Φ−
−−Θ ρ
   (A4) 
The success rate will tend to zero if z* < p*  and 100% if z* > p* (see points 2 and 3 
above).  For example, with p* =  0.1 and z* =  0.2, the success rate declines to around 
92.0 % before steadily increasing to 100%.  The intuition is clear, because under these 
assumptions the submission probability will slowly increase to 100% - and if 
 everyone submits a 100% success rate is guaranteed – not that the top journal would 
welcome such a possibility.  In typical cases, with z* < p*,  the success rate will 
steadily decline. 
3. Acceptance probability 
The acceptance probability is  )~(
),~,~(
q
qzR
−Φ
−−Θ
=
ρ
 .  For a given zT  and p*  this always 
declines as b falls.  Thus increasing noise means the top journal  will receive an 
increasing proportion of substandard papers. 
 
We can reason that R must always decline as follows.  There are two cases to 
consider.  Where p* < z* then R *z→ . To see this suppose that ρ = b  =  0.  In this 
case:  
)~(
)~(*)~(
)~(
),~,~(
q
qz
q
qz
−Φ
−Φ−Φ
=
−Φ
−−Θ ρ
*z=      (A5) 
Now let  b increase causing a change in q~ , but restrict ρ  to be zero.  R  would be 
constant at z*.  Now let the rise in b influence ρ.  This  will cause R  to rise with 
higher values of  ρ  giving a greater increase in R.  So R will steadily increase as we 
move towards ρ =1.  From before )~(),~,~( qqz −Φ→−−Θ ρ when ρ  →1; hence the 
acceptance rate will steadily increase to 100% as b  rises towards 1.   
 
Where p* > z*, a slightly different set of considerations apply, because when b=0,  
the submission rate is zero.   Recall that p*  is the probability of acceptance of the 
breakeven paper.  So the average acceptance rate can be no lower than p*  for any 
value of b.  If b is arbitrarily close to 0, everyone will have the same perceived 
 probability of acceptance, because noise totally dominates the signal.   In practice for 
very low values of b  the submission rate becomes so low that the top journal 
effectively will publish no articles. So these lower reaches are to say the least 
hypothetical.   
4. Expected standards 
The expected standard of submissions, *| qqEz ≥  is given by )~(5.0 qbz λ+ , where 
)~(qλ is the inverse Mills ratio associated q~ (Greene, 1993, p.707).  The expected 
standard of accepted papers is TzzqqEz ≥≥ &*| .  This is calculated using the 
(lengthy) formula to be found in Maddala (1983, p. 368). 
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Figure 1 Submission strategy 
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Figure 3 Systematic optimism 
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Figure 4 Imperfect signal extraction 
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Figure 5 Raising standards – initial impact 
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